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529 
The Protection of Religious Rights Under Australian 
Law 
Denise Meyerson∗
In 1998, Australia’s Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission (“HREOC”) issued a report in which it stated that the 
level of protection afforded to the right to freedom of religion and 
belief in Australia was relatively weak compared to a number of 
comparable countries.
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1
Since the case of R. v. Burgess; Ex parte Henry,
 Although there have been a few changes in 
the intervening ten years, this Article demonstrates that HREOC’s 
statement remains accurate. In this Article, I analyze and evaluate the 
Australian legal framework governing the right to religious freedom, 
the right not to be discriminated against on the ground of religion, 
and the right not to be subjected to religious vilification. I call these 
“religious rights.” Part II deals with federal legislation protective of 
these rights, Part III with constitutional protections, Part IV with 
the right to religious freedom at common law, and Part V with State 
and Territory legislation. 
II. FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE PROTECTION 
2 it has been 
accepted that section 51 (xxix) of the Australian Constitution3—the 
so-called “external affairs” power—authorizes the Australian 
Parliament to pass legislation giving effect to international 
obligations incurred by Australia under international treaties and 
conventions.4
 
 ∗ Professor, Macquarie Law School, Macquarie University. 
 1. HUMAN RIGHTS & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ARTICLE 18: FREEDOM OF 
RELIGION AND BELIEF 23, 139 (1998), available at http://www.hreoc.gov.au/pdf/ 
human_rights/religion/article_18_religious_freedom.pdf. 
 2. R. v. Burgess (1936) 55 C.L.R. 608. 
 3. COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA CONSTITUTION ACT § 51.  
 4. Burgess, 55 C.L.R. at 636–45. 
 Most relevant for the purposes of this Article is 
Australia’s ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and 
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Political Rights (“ICCPR”),5 as a result of which Parliament can 
validly legislate, supported by the external affairs power, to protect 
the right to freedom of religion and belief;6 to prohibit 
discrimination on the ground of religion and belief;7 to prohibit the 
advocacy of religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility, or violence;8 and to protect the right of 
minorities, in community with the other members of their group, to 
profess and practice their own religion.9
Australia also supported the adoption of the 1981 Declaration 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination based on Religion or Belief (“Religion 
Declaration”).
 
10 Although, as a General Assembly Resolution, the 
Religion Declaration does not impose treaty-like obligations,11 it was 
declared to be a relevant international instrument for which the 
Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission has 
responsibility.12
Australia has also ratified the International Labour Organisation 
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 
(“ILO 111”).
 The effect of this will be explained below. 
13
 
 5. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. 
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR] 
(entered into force on Mar. 23, 1976). 
 6. Id. at art. 18. 
 7. Id. at arts. 2, 26. 
 8. Id. at art. 20. State parties are required to prohibit such actions by law. However, 
Australia lodged a reservation in which it reserved the right not to introduce the legislation. 
(Ratification, Aug. 13, 1980).  
 9. Id. at art. 27. 
 10. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination 
Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/36/55 (Nov. 25, 1981) [hereinafter Religion Declaration]. 
 11. Carolyn Evans, Time for a Treaty? The Legal Sufficiency of the Declaration on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination, 2007 BYU L. REV. 617, 628. 
 12. HREOC has the power to inquire into breaches of “human rights.” Human Rights 
and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth.) § 11(f). The term “human rights” is 
defined in section 3 of the HREOC Act as “the rights and freedoms recognized in the 
Covenant, declared by the Declarations or recognised or declared by any relevant international 
instrument.” Id. § 3. The Religion Declaration has been adopted as such an instrument. See 
NICK O’NEILL, SIMON RICE & ROGER DOUGLAS, RETREAT FROM INJUSTICE: HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW IN AUSTRALIA 201–02 (Federation Press 2d ed. 2004). 
 13. International Labour Organisation, Convention (No. 111) Concerning 
Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, June 25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 31 
[hereinafter ILO 111]. 
 This Convention prohibits discrimination on the 
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ground of religion in employment and occupation except where 
religion is an inherent requirement of a particular job.14
Federal domestic legislation has given only limited effect, 
however, to the obligations imposed on Australia as a party to these 
instruments. The main sources of protection for religious rights are 
contained in the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) (“RDA”);
 
15 
the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 
(Cth) (“HREOC Act”);16 and the Workplace Relations Act 1996 
(Cth) (“WRA”).17
The RDA makes it unlawful to discriminate on the ground of 
race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin in various aspects of 
public life, including access to places and facilities, housing and 
accommodation, the provision of goods and services, and 
employment.
  
18 The phrase “ethnic origin” is generally understood 
to open the door to protecting at least some religious groups against 
discrimination. Courts have consistently held, for instance, that Jews 
are a group of people with an “ethnic origin” for the purposes of the 
RDA.19 Sikhs would also likely be regarded as an ethnic group, but 
it is less certain whether Muslims would be covered.20
 The RDA was subsequently amended by the Racial Hatred 
Act 1995 (Cth), which inserted a new part into the RDA (codified as 
Part IIA) dealing with vilification.
 
21
 
 14. Id. at art. 1(2). The job of a pastor at a particular church, for instance, would 
inherently require certain religious qualifications. 
 15. Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth.). 
 16. Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth.). 
 17. Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth.). 
 18. Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth.), § 9. 
 19. See, e.g., Jones v. Scully (2002) 120 F.C.R. 243, 271–72; Miller v. Wertheim (2002) 
F.C.A.F.C. 156, 161. 
 20. For more detailed discussion of the meaning of “ethnic origin,” see NEIL REES ET 
AL., AUSTRALIAN ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW 179–85 (2008). 
 21. Racial Hatred Act 1995 (Cth.). 
 Section 18C(1), which is 
contained in Part IIA, reads: 
It is unlawful for a person to do an act, otherwise than in private, if: 
(a) the act is reasonably likely, in all the circumstances, to 
offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate another person or a 
group of people; and  
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(b) the act is done because of the race, colour or national or 
ethnic origin of the other person or of some or all of the 
people in the group.22
(ii) a fair comment on any event or matter of public 
interest if the comment is an expression of a genuine belief 
held by the person making the comment.
 
The reference to “ethnic origin” in section 18C(1)(b) means 
that a religious group which can also be classified as an ethnic group 
is protected against vilification in the same way that such a group is 
protected against discrimination. 
Section 18D of the RDA, however, contains a series of defenses 
to vilification. It reads: 
Section 18C does not render unlawful anything said or done 
reasonably and in good faith: 
(a) in the performance, exhibition or distribution of an artistic 
work; or 
(b) in the course of any statement, publication, discussion or 
debate made or held for any genuine academic, artistic or 
scientific purpose or any other genuine purpose in the public 
interest; or 
(c) in making or publishing: 
(i) a fair and accurate report of any event or matter of 
public interest; or 
23
Case law makes clear that the impact of the conduct which is 
mentioned in section 18C(1) must be assessed from the perspective 
of a member of the target group.
 
24 However, the terms used by 
section 18C(1)—especially “offend” and “insult”—are very vague 
and appear to cover even conduct which is not seriously harmful and 
merely causes low-level emotional distress. This led to a challenge to 
Part IIA’s constitutionality in Toben v. Jones.25
In Toben, the appellant, Fredrick Toben, had published material 
on the internet that questioned the occurrence of the Holocaust.
 
26
 
 22. Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth.), § 18C(1). 
 23. Id. § 18D. 
 24. See, e.g., Hagan v. Trs. of the Toowoomba Sports Ground Trust (2000) F.C.A. 
1615, ¶¶ 15, 25–26, 31–32. 
 25. Toben v. Jones (2003) 129 F.C.R. 515 (Carr, J.).  
 26. Id. at 520–23. 
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HREOC determined that this material vilified Jewish people, after 
which the Federal Court granted an injunction enforcing HREOC’s 
determination.27 On appeal, Toben argued that Part IIA of the RDA 
was intended to implement Article 4 of the International Convention 
on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(“ICERD”),28 which provides that parties to the ICERD should 
criminalize the dissemination of ideas based on “racial hatred.”29 He 
inferred from this that section 18C had to be read down to cover 
only acts which amount to an expression of racial hatred if it were 
not to be beyond the constitutional power of the Commonwealth.30
The Full Federal Court rejected this argument. Justice Carr, with 
whom Justice Kiefel agreed on this matter, wrote that “acts done in 
public which are objectively likely to offend, insult, humiliate or 
intimidate and which are done because of race, colour or national or 
ethnic origin are likely to incite other persons to racial hatred or 
discrimination or to constitute acts of racial hatred or 
discrimination.”
 
31 He thought that the provisions were therefore 
consistent with the ICERD and constitutionally valid as an exercise 
of the external affairs power.32 Justice Allsop pointed out that Part 
IIA was intended to implement not only Article 4 of the ICERD but 
also the other provisions of the ICERD and the ICCPR that cover 
the elimination of racial discrimination in all its forms, not only that 
of racial hatred.33 He therefore found that Part IIA was reasonably 
capable of being considered as appropriate and adapted to 
implement the objectives of the ICERD, and that it was not 
necessary to read it as the appellant had suggested.34
Another possible constitutional problem with the anti-vilification 
provisions of the RDA (as well as the state anti-vilification laws which 
are considered below) is that they may be in conflict with the implied 
freedom of political communication contained in the Australian 
Constitution. This freedom was recognized in the cases of 
 
 
 27. Id. at 518. 
 28. International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), at art. 4, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, Annex, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/2106(XX)/Annex, (Dec. 21, 1965). 
 29. Toben, 129 F.C.R. at 523–24. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 524. 
 32. Id. at 524–25. 
 33. Id. at 551 (Allsop, J.). 
 34. Id. 
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Nationwide News Proprietary Ltd. v. Wills35 and Australian Capital 
Television Proprietary Ltd. v. Commonwealth. 36
The test for determining whether a law infringes the freedom of 
communication is explained in the case of Lange v. Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation.
 
37 This test has two prongs. The first 
concerns whether the law effectively burdens freedom of 
communication about government or political matters either in its 
terms, operation, or effect.38
reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end the 
fulfillment of which is compatible with the maintenance of the 
constitutionally prescribed system of representative and responsible 
government and the procedure prescribed by s 128 for submitting 
a proposed amendment of the Constitution to the informed 
decision of the people . . . .
 If the answer to this question is “yes,” 
the law may nevertheless survive challenge if it is 
39
Although the High Court has not yet considered whether the 
anti-vilification provisions of the RDA infringe the freedom of 
political communication, it is obvious that much will depend on 
whether the communications in question are “political”
 
40
 
 35. Nationwide News Proprietary, Ltd. v. Wills (1992) 177 C.L.R. 1. 
 36. Austl. Capital Television Proprietary, Ltd. v. Commonwealth (1992) 177 C.L.R. 
106. 
 37. Lange v. Austl. Broad. Corp. (1997) 189 C.L.R. 520, 567–68. 
 38. Id. at 567.  
 39. Id. 
 40. The exact meaning of “political communication” is disputed. See generally, e.g., 
Michael Chesterman, When is a Communication “Political”?, 14(2) LEGIS. STUD. 5 (2000); 
Dan Meagher, What is “Political Communication”? The Rationale and Scope of the Implied 
Freedom of Political Communication, 28 MELB. U. L. REV. 438, 467 (2004) (arguing that a 
communication should be considered political “if the subject matter of the communication is 
such that it may reasonably be relevant to the federal voting choices of its likely audiences” and that 
subject matter alone should “determine whether a communication qualifies for constitutional 
protection”). 
 and, if so, 
whether the anti-vilification provisions unduly impair the freedom. 
Without going into these issues in any detail, and on the assumption 
that the communications are political, it is my view that the 
cumulative effect of the low threshold of harm, the indeterminacy of 
the terms used, the failure to require that anyone actually be moved 
by the relevant conduct to harm members of the target group, and 
the failure to require that any actual person be offended, insulted, 
humiliated, or intimidated by the defendant’s conduct signal a 
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remedial response disproportionate to the potential harm of 
vilification. 
Of course, the exemptions contained in section 18D narrow the 
reach of section 18C(1)(a), but the question is whether they narrow 
it sufficiently.41 In this regard, one troubling aspect of the 
exemptions is that they are qualified by the requirement that 
anything said or done—for instance, in the performance of an artistic 
work—be said or done “reasonably and in good faith.”42 In a High 
Court special-leave application, Chief Justice Gleeson noted the 
difficulty of applying the concept of reasonableness to art forms such 
as cartoons, which in their nature are intended to lampoon or 
ridicule, and he asked how one is to decide what sort of ridicule is 
reasonable and what sort is unreasonable.43 Moreover, the notions of 
“genuine purpose”44 and “matter of public interest”45
The only decision to consider the section 18D exemptions in any 
detail is the Federal Court case of Bropho v. Human Rights and 
Equal Opportunity Commission, which addressed the question of 
whether a cartoon, published in a Western Australia newspaper and 
admittedly within the realm of offensive expression prohibited by the 
RDA, qualified for the RDA’s “artistic works” exemption.
 are 
comparably vague and have a potentially chilling effect on freedom 
of speech. 
46 As 
noted above, such expression must be done “reasonably and in good 
faith” in order to qualify.47 One text sums up the approach of two of 
the three judges in the case by saying that “[i]t is strongly arguable 
that both French J and Lee J . . . saw the word ‘reasonably’ as 
applying to the respondent’s message as well as to the method by 
which that message was conveyed.”48
 
 41. See Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth.), §§ 18C(1)(a), 18D. 
 42. Id. § 18D. 
 43. Bropho v. HREOC [2005] HCA Trans 9, lines 101–258 (Feb. 4, 2005), available 
at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/other/HCATrans/2005/9.html?query= 
title(Bropho). 
 44. Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth.), § 18D(b). 
 45. Id. § 18D(c)(i). 
 46. Bropho v. HREOC (2004) 135 F.C.R. 105. 
 47. Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth.), § 18D. 
 48. REES ET AL., supra note 20, at 577. 
 But if section 18D must be 
interpreted in this way—that is, the speaker’s message must be 
reasonable before the defenses can be made out—then there is a 
strong argument that the exemptions do not sufficiently protect the 
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freedom to contribute to robust public discourse on political 
matters, this freedom being not only central to a democratic society, 
but also protected by the Australian Constitution.49
Under the RDA, unlawful discrimination and vilification are civil 
wrongs and may be enforced by private civil action only.
  
50 There is 
no regulator charged with the task of pursuing and prosecuting 
people who break the law.51 Furthermore, there is no right of direct 
access to courts.52 Rather, a two-stage enforcement model is 
followed.53 In terms of the HREOC Act, an individual or group 
must begin by lodging a complaint of unlawful discrimination with 
HREOC—Australia’s national human rights institution, an 
independent statutory authority—which must investigate the 
complaint and attempt to resolve it by alternative dispute resolution 
measures.54 If the complaint is not resolved, the complainant may 
choose to commence proceedings in a federal court.55 The court has 
broad discretionary power to make such orders as it thinks fit.56
In addition to the role it gives HREOC in relation to the anti-
discrimination laws, the HREOC Act gives HREOC functions and 
powers relating to the protection and promotion of human rights.
 
57 
In particular, HREOC has the power to investigate violations of 
human rights recognized in certain international instruments where 
the alleged violator is the Commonwealth or an agent of the 
Commonwealth or the violation occurs under a Commonwealth 
enactment.58
 
 49. For further discussion of this issue, see Dan Meagher, So Far So Good?: A Critical 
Evaluation of Racial Vilification Laws in Australia, 32 FED. L. REV. 225 (2004). Nicholas 
Aroney discusses the compatibility of the State religious-vilification laws described in Part V 
below with the implied freedom of political communication. Nicholas Aroney, The 
Constitutional (In)validity of Religious Vilification Laws: Implications for their Interpretation, 
34 FED. L. REV. 287 (2006). 
 50. REES ET AL., supra note 20, at 7. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. HREOC cannot make enforceable determinations because it cannot exercise 
judicial power by virtue of the separation of judicial power that is entrenched in the 
Constitution. Brandy v. HREOC (1995) 183 C.L.R. 245, 260. 
 55. REES ET AL., supra note 20, at 687. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth), §§ 10A to 29. 
 Because the international instruments include the 
 58. Section 11(f) of the Act includes in the functions of the Commission the power to 
inquire into any “act or practice that may be inconsistent with or contrary to any human 
right.” Id. § 11(f). The terms “act” and “practice” are defined in section 3 to include acts and 
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ICCPR and the Religion Declaration, HREOC can investigate 
violations of religious rights.59
HREOC can also investigate complaints of employment 
discrimination based on religion in breach of ILO 111.
 
60
[I]n respect of a particular job based on the inherent requirements 
of the job; or in connection with employment as a member of the 
staff of an institution that is conducted in accordance with the 
doctrines, tenets, beliefs or teachings of a particular religion or 
creed, being a distinction, exclusion or preference made in good 
faith in order to avoid injury to the religious susceptibilities of 
adherents of that religion or that creed.
 
Discrimination is defined in section 3 of the HREOC Act, however, 
so as not to include any distinction, exclusion, or preference: 
61
The HREOC Act does not provide enforceable remedies against 
human-rights violations or discrimination in employment. Where the 
Commission finds that a complaint is substantiated, its powers are 
limited to attempting to resolve the complaint through conciliation 
or, failing that, to submit a report to the federal Attorney General for 
tabling in Parliament.
 
Thus, religious organizations, for example, remain free to base their 
employment decisions on religious factors in certain instances. 
62
The WRA provides an additional source of federal legislative 
protection by proscribing termination of employment on certain 
grounds, one of which is religion.
 
63 The WRA also includes 
exceptions that mirror those found in section 3 of the HREOC Act 
discussed above.64
 
practices done “by or on behalf of the Commonwealth or an authority of the 
Commonwealth,” or “under an enactment.” Id. § 3. 
 59. Id. § 3 (definitions of “covenant,” “human rights,” and “relevant international 
instrument”). The ICCPR is expressly identified in the Act and the Religion Declaration was 
declared a “relevant international instrument” by the Attorney General in accordance with his 
power under § 47 of the Act. See O’NEILL, RICE & DOUGLAS, supra note 12, at 201–02. 
 60. See Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth), § 31(b). 
ILO 111 is also incorporated into the Act at Schedule I. Id. Schedule I. 
 61. Id. § 3. 
 62. Id. § 11. For further discussion of HREOC’s powers in relation to human rights 
complaints, see O’NEILL, RICE & DOUGLAS, supra note 12, at 201–03. 
 63. Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), § 659(2)(f). 
 
 64. Id. § 659(4) (“Subsection (2) does not prevent a matter referred to in paragraph 
(2)(f) from being a reason for terminating a person’s employment as a member of the staff of 
an institution that is conducted in accordance with the doctrines, tenets, beliefs or teachings of 
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS 
The Commonwealth Constitution contains very few guarantees 
for rights and freedoms. Notably, it does not contain a guarantee of 
equality. It follows that there is no constitutional freedom from 
religious discrimination. Freedom of religion is, however, guaranteed 
under section 116 of the Constitution, which provides: “The 
Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any religion, 
or for imposing any religious observance, or for prohibiting the free 
exercise of religion, and no religious test shall be required as a 
qualification for any office or public trust under the 
Commonwealth.”65
The wording of section 116 and that of the First Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution are substantially similar.
 
66 The High Court 
has, however, emphasized the differences between the Australian and 
the U.S. guarantees. In the Court’s view, the use of the word “for” 
implies that the section 116 prohibition applies only to laws the 
intended purpose of which is to establish religion or impair its free 
exercise. 67
The leading Australian case addressing the interpretation of 
section 116’s “establishment clause” is Attorney-General (Vict) ex 
rel. Black v. Commonwealth (“DOGS Case”).
 
68 In this case, the 
High Court considered a challenge to a Commonwealth grants 
scheme.69 The scheme provided funding to the States on condition 
that some of the money be directed to private schools, most of 
which were Catholic schools.70
 
a particular religion or creed, if the employer terminates the employment in good faith to avoid 
injury to the religious susceptibilities of adherents of that religion or creed.”). 
 65. COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA CONSTITUTION ACT § 116. 
 66. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.”) with COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA 
CONSTITUTION ACT § 116 (“The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any 
religion, or for imposing any religious observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of any 
religion, and no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust 
under the Commonwealth.”). 
 67. Attorney-General (Vict.) ex rel. Black v. Commonwealth (1981) 146 C.L.R. 559, 
579 (Barwick C.J.); Kruger v. Commonwealth (1997) 190 C.L.R. 1, 40 (Brennan, C.J.); see 
also U.S. CONST. amend. I; Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act § 116. 
 68. Attorney-General (Vict.) ex rel. Black, 146 C.L.R. 559. 
 69. Id. at 560–61. 
 70. Id. 
 It was argued that state funding of 
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church schools amounted to an establishment of religion.71 The 
High Court rejected the challenge, holding that the establishment 
clause under section 116 is applicable only when the establishment 
of religion is the purpose behind the making of a law.72 Indeed, 
Chief Justice Barwick said it must be the law’s “express and . . . 
single purpose.”73 The Court also interpreted the meaning of 
“establishment” very narrowly, holding that it refers only to the 
creation of an official state religion or state church.74
The High Court also narrowly interprets the free exercise clause 
of section 116. The most important free exercise case is Adelaide Co. 
of Jehovah’s Witnesses, Inc. v. Commonwealth (“Jehovah’s Witnesses 
Case”).
  
75 There, the High Court held that the property of the 
Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses was legitimately seized 
under wartime regulations because the Witnesses’ refusal to bear 
arms or take sides in the war prejudiced the defense of the 
Commonwealth.76 Chief Justice Latham remarked, “It is consistent 
with the maintenance of religious liberty for the State to restrain 
actions and courses of conduct which are inconsistent with the 
maintenance of civil government or prejudicial to the continued 
existence of the community.”77 The other judges reasoned similarly, 
showing little recognition of the principle that government must 
meet stringent standards when it seeks to infringe constitutionally 
guaranteed rights and freedoms.78
The case of Kruger v. Commonwealth
 Normally, one would expect an 
inquiry into the importance of the government’s purpose and the 
proportionality of the means it has chosen in its pursuit of that 
purpose. In this case, however, the Court simply deferred to the 
government’s assessment of the danger posed to the public by the 
religious conduct of the Jehovah’s Witnesses. 
79
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 581–83. 
 73. Id. at 579. 
 74. Id. at 582 (Barwick, C.J.), 604 (Gibbs, J.), 616 (Mason, J.), 653 (Wilson, J.). 
 75. Adelaide Co. of Jehovah’s Witnesses, Inc. v. Commonwealth (1943) 67 C.L.R. 116. 
 76. Id. at 118–19. 
 77. Id. at 131. 
 78. Id. at 148–50 (Rich, J.); id. at 150–56 (Starke, J.); id. at 156–57 (McTiernan, J.); 
id. at 158–68 (Williams, J.). 
 79. Kruger v. Commonwealth (1997) 190 C.L.R. 1. 
 provides further evidence 
of the narrow approach the High Court takes to the Constitution’s 
religious freedom guarantee. In Kruger, the plaintiffs challenged the 
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constitutionality of the Aboriginals Ordinance 1918 (N. Terr.), 
which authorized the removal of Aboriginal children from their 
parents.80 It was argued that the Ordinance invaded the children’s 
freedom of religion by preventing their participation in community 
religious practices.81 This argument was, however, rejected once 
again on the ground that the law did not have as its purpose the 
prohibition of the free exercise of religion.82 Because it is rare to find 
laws in Western democracies that specifically set out to interfere with 
religious freedom,83
Furthermore, section 116 does not restrict the legislative power 
of the States and Territories. The only State constitution providing 
for the right to freedom of religion and belief is the Constitution of 
Tasmania.
 it appears that section 116 of the 
Commonwealth Constitution is destined to play only a very minor 
role in protecting religious freedom in Australia. 
84 However, its guarantee—which has never been the 
subject of a judicial decision—can be repealed by an ordinary Act of 
the Tasmanian Parliament without following any special 
procedures.85
Although the right to freedom of religion is recognized by the 
common law, it is clear that the right can, in principle, be taken away 
by the State Parliaments. As Justice White said in Grace Bible Church 
Inc. v. Reedman, “There is nothing in [the] common law which 
inhibits or is capable of inhibiting the power of the Parliament of the 
State to make laws for the peace, welfare and good government of 
this State, including laws that affect the freedom of religious worship 
and religious expression.”
  
IV. PROTECTION AT COMMON LAW 
86
Yet in an interesting recent case, Evans v. State of New South 
Wales, common-law rights proved more difficult to restrict than one 
  
 
 80. Aboriginals Ordinance 1918 (N. Terr.), §§ 6, 7. 
 81. Kruger, 190 C.L.R. at 2. 
 82. Id. at 40. 
 83. But see Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) 
(finding the city’s ordinance regulating ritual animal slaughter to be targeted at the religious 
practices of a particular religious group).  
 84. Constitution Act 1934 (Tas), § 46. 
 85. Some State constitutions contain provisions which cannot be amended or repealed 
without meeting special “manner and form” requirements, such as a referendum or a special 
majority. See, e.g., Constitution Act 1975 (Vict.) § 18(h) and Part VII. 
 86. Grace Bible Church, Inc. v. Reedman (1984) 36 S.A. ST. R. 376, 385. 
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might perhaps have expected in the light of traditional approaches to 
the common law.87
 Evans dealt with a regulation made under the World Youth Day 
Act 2006 (N.S.W.).
 In this case, the right to freedom of speech was 
at stake. 
88 World Youth Day was a large gathering of 
young members of the Catholic Church held in Sydney in 2008. 
Clause 7 of the Regulation gave police officers and authorized 
persons the power to direct people in World Youth Day areas to 
cease engaging in conduct that caused “annoyance or inconvenience 
to participants in a World Youth Day event.”89 Clause 7 was made 
under section 58(2)(b) of the Act, which authorized the making of 
regulations with respect to “the conduct of the public [on] World 
Youth Day venues and facilities.”90
In defining what “conduct” meant, the Full Federal Court 
reasoned that, given the very broad range of acts to which this word 
might apply, there were “constructional choices open,” and the 
Court made reference to the well-known principle “that Acts be 
construed, where constructional choices are open, so as not to 
encroach upon common law rights and freedoms.”
 But what did Parliament mean 
by “conduct”? 
91 The corollary 
of this principle is that if Parliament intends to interfere with 
fundamental rights and freedoms, it must do so in the clearest of 
language.92 The Court then went on to point out that what is 
annoying to some may not be annoying to others, and that annoying 
opinions may be those which do not disrupt or interfere with the 
freedoms of others and are not objectively offensive.93 The Court 
took the view that, in the absence of clear language indicating 
otherwise, it could not have been Parliament’s intention that 
regulations would be made interfering with freedom of speech to 
this extent.94
 
 87. Evans v. State of New South Wales (2008) 168 F.C.R. 576. 
 88. Id. at 577. 
 89. Id. at 579. 
 90. World Youth Day Act 2006 (N.S.W.), § 58(2)(b). 
 91. Evans, 168 F.C.R. at 593. 
 92. Id. at 592–94. 
 93. Id. at 597. 
 94. Id. 
 Section 58 of the World Youth Day Act therefore did 
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not support that element of Clause 7 which sought to prevent 
merely annoying conduct.95
The Federal Court’s robust approach to common-law rights in 
Evans, which draws on the theory of common-law 
constitutionalism,
 
96 obviously has the potential to assist in the 
protection of freedom of religion. But even suitably beefed up 
common-law protection is incapable of dislodging the principle of 
State parliamentary sovereignty. Although a court intent on 
maximally protecting the common-law right to freedom of religion 
might exhibit unusual reluctance to find that Parliament intended to 
invade the right, the presumption that Parliament does not intend to 
interfere with common-law rights and freedoms remains 
rebuttable.97 This means that, provided a State or Territory 
Parliament makes its intention perfectly plain, it is free to establish 
any religion, impose religious observances, forbid religious beliefs 
and practices, and require a religious test as a qualification for public 
office. Even the Tasmanian constitutional guarantee can be repealed 
at will, as discussed above. Furthermore, efforts to rectify this 
situation have received little support as exemplified by the failure of a 
1988 referendum aimed at amending section 116 of the 
Commonwealth Constitution so as to confer greater protection 
against State and Territory legislation infringing the freedom of 
religion.98
Having discussed the extent to which the right to freedom of 
religion and belief is protected by federal legislation, the 
Commonwealth and State Constitutions, and the common law, this 
Article now turns to relevant State and Territory laws, noting that 
such laws operate concurrently with federal laws if they are consistent 
with or more beneficial than federal laws.
 
V. STATE AND TERRITORY LAWS 
99
 
 95. Id. 
 96. I discuss common-law constitutionalism elsewhere. Denise Meyerson, State and 
Federal Privative Clauses—Not So Different After All, 16 PUB. L. REV. 39, 45–50 (2005). 
 97. Durham Holdings Proprietary Ltd. v. State of New South Wales (2001) 205 C.L.R. 
399, ¶ 31. 
 98. See Tony Blackshield, Religion and Australian Constitutional Law, in LAW AND 
RELIGION: GOD, THE STATE AND THE COMMON LAW 81, 102 (Peter Radan, Denise Meyerson 
& Rosalind F. Croucher eds., 2005). 
 99. See O’NEILL, RICE & DOUGLAS, supra note 12, at 481–82. 
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The recent enactment of bills of rights in the Australian Capital 
Territory (Austl. Cap. Terr.) and Victoria significantly added to 
Australia’s legal landscape. The Human Rights Act 2004 (Austl. 
Cap. Terr.) (“Human Rights Act”)100 and the Charter of Human 
Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vict.) (“Charter of Human 
Rights and Responsibilities”)101 incorporate most of the rights in the 
ICCPR, including rights of relevance to this Article. Specifically, they 
recognize the right to recognition and equality before the law;102 the 
right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and belief;103 and 
the rights of minorities or cultural rights.104 These Acts can be 
amended or repealed in the ordinary way—that is, without following 
any special procedures. They are primarily interpretative instruments, 
requiring those who interpret and apply legislation to do so in a way 
that is compatible with human rights, to the extent that it is possible 
to do so, but subject to the proviso that the interpretation must be 
consistent with the purpose of the legislation. The Human Rights 
Act also allows the ACT Supreme Court to make a “declaration of 
incompatibility”105 and the Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities allows the Victorian Supreme Court to make a 
declaration of “inconsistent interpretation.”106
 
 100. Human Rights Act 2004 (Austl. Cap. Terr.). 
 101. Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vict.). 
 102. Human Rights Act 2004 (Austl. Cap. Terr.), § 8; Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vict.), § 8. 
 103. Human Rights Act 2004 (Austl. Cap. Terr.), § 14; Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vict.), § 14. 
 104. Human Rights Act 2004 (Austl. Cap. Terr.), § 27; Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vict.), § 19. 
 105. Human Rights Act 2004 (Austl. Cap. Terr.), § 32(2). 
 106. Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vict), §36(2). 
 Such declarations are 
to the effect that challenged legislation is incompatible with human 
rights or is incapable of being interpreted consistently with human 
rights. They do not, however, affect the validity or enforceability of 
the offending legislation. Instead, the ball is returned to the 
government’s court, which may or may not decide to amend the 
legislation. Finally, public authorities must act compatibly with 
human rights under the two Acts. So far there have been no 
challenges to legislation or acts of public authorities on the ground 
of conflict with the religious rights contained in the Human Rights 
Act or the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities. 
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Six of the eight states and territories—Western Australia, 
Queensland, Tasmania, Victoria, the Australian Capital Territory, 
and the Northern Territory—have legislated to prohibit 
discrimination in various areas of public life on the ground of 
religious belief and/or conviction, activity, and affiliation.107 
“Religion” is not defined in any of the legislation, with the exception 
of the Northern Territory Anti-Discrimination Act, which expressly 
defines religious belief or activity to include Aboriginal spiritual 
beliefs or activities.108 Although New South Wales and South 
Australia have not legislated in this area, the New South Wales Anti-
Discrimination Act 1977 (N.S.W.), which forbids discrimination on 
the ground of race, defines the term “race” to include both “ethnic 
origin” and “ethno-religious” origin.109 It therefore affords 
protection against discrimination for religious groups which can also 
be classified as ethnic groups.110
The State and Territory laws prohibiting religious discrimination 
contain the usual exemptions for the benefit of religious 
organizations. Employees can, for instance, be required to identify 
with a particular religion if this is an inherent requirement of the 
 
 
 107. REES ET AL., supra note 20, at 374. 
 108. Anti-Discrimination Act 2007 (N. Terr.), § 4(4). The extent to which Aboriginal 
spiritual beliefs and activities are protected by Australian law is a large and complex topic which 
cannot be covered in this Article. Two points are, however, worth noting. First, as Marion 
Maddox shows in her sensitive discussion of this issue, the religious traditions of indigenous 
Australians and the role played by sacred sites and land in their spiritual lives are not properly 
recognized or even fully understood.  See MARION MADDOX, FOR GOD AND COUNTRY: 
RELIGIOUS DYNAMICS IN AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLITICS ch. 6 (2001). Second, heritage 
protection and native title legislation provide only limited protections and are subject to 
difficulties such as the need, under some laws, for Aboriginals to prove the religious 
significance of their sacred locations. This is particularly problematic given the fact that 
Aboriginal values and traditions often place great importance on religious secrets. For a 
detailed discussion, see Ernst Willheim, Australian Legal Procedures and the Protection of Secret 
Aboriginal Spiritual Beliefs: A Fundamental Conflict, in LAW AND RELIGION IN THEORETICAL 
AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT ch. 10 (Peter Cane, Carolyn Evans & Zoë Robinson eds., 2008).  
The problem of religious secrets emerged as part of a controversy about the construction 
of a bridge linking Hindmarsh Island to the mainland. The construction of the bridge had 
been opposed on Aboriginal heritage grounds and a number of Ngarrindjeri women 
subsequently approached the responsible Minister, claiming that the island was sacred to them 
for reasons that could not be revealed because they involved secret “women’s business.” For 
discussion of the controversy and the cases to which it led, see ANN CURTHOYS, ANN 
GENOVESE & ALEXANDER REILLY, RIGHTS AND REDEMPTION: HISTORY, LAW AND 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLE ch. 7 (2008). 
 109. Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (N.S.W.), § 4. 
 110. See REES ET AL., supra note 20, at 192–94. 
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job.111 Furthermore, in some of the States and Territories—the 
ACT, the Northern Territory, and Western Australia—employers are 
under a duty in certain circumstances to accommodate the religious 
needs of employees.112
Blasphemy is almost certainly an offence in the majority of 
Australian jurisdictions. However, charges have not been laid against 
a person since 1919, and even those were subsequently 
withdrawn.
 
113 Three of the States—Victoria, Queensland, and 
Tasmania—also prohibit vilification on religious grounds, and New 
South Wales prohibits religious vilification linked to ethnicity.114
The State anti-vilification legislation is in some respects like and 
in some respects unlike the federal anti-vilification provisions 
contained in the RDA and discussed in Part II above. The 
exemptions in the State legislation are broadly similar to those in the 
RDA. Generally speaking, they cover conduct engaged in reasonably 
and in good faith for such purposes as academic, artistic, and 
scientific purposes, or other purposes in the public interest.
 
115 
However, insofar as the definition of vilification is concerned, the 
State provisions set a higher threshold of harm than the provisions 
contained in the RDA. In particular, the conduct in question must 
satisfy tests such as inciting hatred towards, or serious contempt for, 
or severe ridicule of a person or group of persons.116 Furthermore, 
the impact of the conduct must be assessed from the perspective of 
the ordinary member of the community, not from the perspective of 
a member of the target group.117 These differences make it more 
difficult for an applicant relying on State legislation to succeed than 
an applicant relying on the RDA.118
Both unlawful discrimination on ground of religion and religious 
vilification are civil wrongs in terms of the relevant State and 
Territory laws.
 
119
 
 111. Id. at 376–77. 
 112. Id. at 378. 
 113. Lawrence McNamara, Blasphemy, in LAW AND RELIGION, supra note 98, at 197, 
197–98. 
 114. REES ET AL., supra note 20, at 593. 
 115. Id. at 588–89. 
 116. Id. at 579. 
 117. Id. at 579–80. 
 118. Id. at 580. 
 119. Id. at 7, 593. 
 As with the Commonwealth process, States and 
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Territories follow a two-stage enforcement model.120 Once a 
complaint is filed with the relevant public agency, investigation and 
non-binding conciliation follow.121 If conciliation fails, complainants 
may demand a hearing. One difference between the State and 
Commonwealth approaches, however, is that responsibility for the 
second stage is generally given to tribunals rather than courts.122 
Generally speaking, the available remedies are findings of a 
declaratory nature, compensatory damages, and injunctive-style 
orders.123
In Victoria and Queensland, “serious” religious vilification is also 
a criminal offense.
  
124 To rise to the level of criminal offense, intent 
must be proved, and, in Queensland, there must be some form of 
aggravating conduct, such as threatening physical harm to person or 
property or inciting others to threaten such harm.125 In Victoria, 
aggravating conduct is a requirement only if the likely impact of the 
conduct is “hatred.”126
There have been very few religious vilification cases in Australia 
and no reports of prosecutions for the criminal offense of religious 
vilification in Victoria or Queensland.
 
127 Perhaps the most 
controversial case, raising the freedom of Christians to teach about 
Islam, was brought under section 8(1) of the Racial and Religious 
Tolerance Act 2001 (Vict.) (“RRTA”) which provides, “A person 
must not, on the ground of the religious belief or activity of another 
person or class of persons, engage in conduct that incites hatred 
against, serious contempt for, or revulsion or severe ridicule of, that 
other person or class of persons.”128
 
 120. Id at 7. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 610. 
 123. Id. at 687. 
 124. Id. at 598–99. 
 125. Id. at 599. 
 126. Id. at 598–99. 
 127. Id. at 594. 
 128. Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001 (Vict.), § 8(1). 
 
The exemptions under the RRTA are contained in sections 11 
and 12. Section 12 contains an exemption for private conduct and 
section 11(1) provides: 
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(1) A person does not contravene section 7 or 8 if the person 
establishes that the person’s conduct was engaged in reasonably 
and in good faith – 
(a) in the performance, exhibition or distribution of an artistic 
work; or 
(b) in the course of any statement, publication, discussion or 
debate made or held, or any other conduct engaged in, for – 
(i) any genuine academic, artistic, religious or scientific 
purpose; or 
(ii) any purpose that is in the public interest; or 
(c) in making or publishing a fair and accurate report of any 
event or matter of public interest.129
These provisions were invoked in a case involving Catch the Fire 
Ministries, which is an evangelical group, part of whose ministry is to 
convert people from Islam. Highly critical statements about Islam, 
illustrated by numerous references to Islamic texts, were made by a 
pastor of the Church during a seminar, by another pastor in a 
newsletter, and in an article published on the Church’s website.
 
130 
Three converts to Islam—who seemed to have attended the seminar 
as part of a deliberate plan131—complained that the ministry and its 
two pastors had incited hatred against Muslims.132 This complaint 
was upheld by the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal in 
Islamic Council of Victoria Inc. v. Catch the Fire Ministries Inc.133 
The Tribunal found that the respondents had breached section 8 of 
the RRTA and that the “religious purpose” defense had not been 
made out because the views expressed were unbalanced and 
therefore the respondents had not acted “reasonably” and “in good 
faith.”134
Catch the Fire Ministries appealed to the Victorian Court of 
Appeal.
 
135
 
 129. Id. § 11(1). 
 130. Islamic Council of Victoria Inc. v. Catch the Fire Ministries Inc. (2004) V.C.A.T. 
2510, ¶¶ [74], [75]. 
 131. See id. ¶ [73].  
 132. See id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. ¶ [390]. 
 135. Catch the Fire Ministries Inc. v. Islamic Council of Victoria Inc. (2006) 235 A.L.R. 
750. 
 The Court found that the Tribunal had made errors of 
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law in its interpretation of section 8.136 In setting out the correct 
interpretation, the Court made a number of points. First, it said that 
the Tribunal had erred by considering the effect of the words on an 
“ordinary reasonable” reader or hearer when it should have 
considered their effect on the particular audience to which they were 
directed.137 Judge Nettle explained that the correct question is 
“whether the natural and ordinary effect of the conduct is to incite 
hatred or other relevant emotion in the circumstances of the 
case,”138 which include the characteristics of the audience to which 
the conduct is directed.139 Furthermore, the effect of the conduct 
must be gauged by reference to the reasonable140 or ordinary141 
member of that audience. There is no requirement, however, that 
the conduct must actually incite hatred.142
A further error, at least according to Judge Nettle, involved 
failing to distinguish between inciting hatred or other relevant 
emotion against a religious belief and inciting hatred against the 
adherents of a religion. His Honor remarked that there are many 
people who may “despise each other’s faiths and yet bear each other 
no ill will.”
 
143
[I]s not a prohibition against saying things about the religious 
beliefs of persons which are offensive to those persons, or even 
against saying things about the religious beliefs of one group of 
persons which would cause another group of persons to despise 
those beliefs. It is against saying things about the religious beliefs 
and practices of persons which go so far as to incite other persons 
to hate persons who adhere to those religious beliefs.
 “The prohibition in s[ection] 8,” he concluded: 
144
 
 136. Id. ¶ [81]. 
 137. Id. ¶ [18]. 
 138. Id. ¶ [19]. 
 139. Id. ¶¶ [17]–[19]. 
 140. Id. ¶ [18] (Nettle, J.A.) (suggesting that “[section] 8 has in view the effect of 
conduct on a reasonable member of the class of persons to whom the conduct is directed”). 
 141. Id. ¶ [132] (Ashley, J.A.) (“I prefer the formulation that it should be decided by 
reference to an ‘ordinary’ rather than a ‘reasonable’ member of the audience class.”); id. ¶ 
[158] (Neave, J.A.) (“[I]t may be more appropriate to consider the effect of the words or 
conduct on an ‘ordinary’ member of the class to which it is directed . . . .”). 
 142. Id. ¶¶ [12]–[14] (Nettle, J.A.) (“I . . . allow that incitive conduct is capable of 
contravening [section] 8 without necessarily causing hatred or serious contempt or revulsion or 
serious ridicule.”); id. ¶¶ [153]–[154] (Neave J.A.). 
 143. Id. ¶ [33] (Nettle, J.A.). 
 144. Id. ¶ [80]. 
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In rejecting the applicability of the “religious purpose” 
exemption under the Act, the Tribunal, relying on expert evidence 
concerning the truth and falsity of the claims made about Islam, had 
emphasized the fact that the views expressed were one-sided and 
unbalanced.145 It remarked that the seminar “was not conducted 
reasonably because it was ‘excessive.’ It was a one-sided delivery of a 
view of the Qur’an and Muslims’ beliefs, which were not 
representative. It was designed to put Muslim people and their 
beliefs in a bad light.”146 Similar comments were made about the 
article. The Tribunal wrote: “There is no attempt in the article to 
distinguish between moderate and extremist Muslims. . . . [A]s with 
the newsletter, I find that the respondent does not obtain the benefit 
of the exemption because the person’s conduct could not be 
regarded as reasonable and in good faith.”147
These remarks about “balance” concerned Judge Nettle. He 
wrote that “it was calculated to lead to error for a secular tribunal to 
attempt to assess the theological propriety of what was asserted at 
the Seminar.”
 
148 Judge Neave also expressed reservations about the 
attempt of the Tribunal to assess the theological accuracy of what 
was said at the Seminar.149 However, she thought that questions of 
balance or accuracy might be relevant at the stage of deciding 
“whether the statements [are] likely to incite hatred.”150 Judge 
Ashley preferred to leave open whether the Tribunal’s consideration 
of lack of balance in the seminar presentation led it into error.151
In explaining their own view of the meaning of the religious 
purpose exemption under the RRTA, Judges Nettle and Neave held 
that when statements are made for a religious purpose, the 
reasonableness of the conduct must be judged by the standards of 
“an open and just multicultural society,” which allows for differences 
in views about religions.
 
152
 
 145. Islamic Council of Victoria Inc. V.C.A.T. 2510, ¶ [389]. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. ¶ [394]. 
 148. Catch the Fire Ministries Inc. 235 A.L.R. 750, ¶ [36] (Nettle, J.A.). 
 149. Id. ¶¶ [178]–[179] (Neave, J.A.). 
 150. Id. ¶ [179]. 
 151. Id. ¶ [132] (Ashley, J.A.). 
 152. Id. ¶¶ [94]–[98] (Nettle, J.A.); id. ¶ [197] (Neave, J.A.). 
 Although perhaps an improvement on 
the idea of “balance,” this is not a particularly illuminating test. It 
raises more questions than it answers, and it is questionable whether 
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Judge Nettle shed any extra light on the issue when he added: “It is 
only when what is said is so ill-informed or misconceived or ignorant 
and so hurtful as to go beyond the bounds of what tolerance should 
accommodate that it may be regarded as unreasonable.”153
Catch the Fire Ministries highlights the potential conflict between 
religious vilification legislation and the protection of religiously 
motivated speech. There is a possible constitutional dimension to 
this conflict insofar as such legislation may infringe upon the implied 
freedom of political communication.
 
154 The freedom-of-political-
communication issue was briefly discussed above in Part II, albeit 
only in relation to the RDA, which is framed more broadly than the 
RRTA.155 Insofar as the validity of the RRTA is concerned, the 
Court in Catch the Fire Ministries found that, properly construed, it 
does not infringe upon the implied freedom.156
The conclusion that a person may be found to have vilified another 
religion by detailed and generally accurate quotation of its sacred 
texts—a verdict based on the views of expert witnesses that the 
quotations are unrepresentative—is troubling in the extreme. 
Overall, it seems likely that, interpreted in this fashion, the law will 
encourage religious disagreement to be played out by the 
 Although there is, in 
my view, room for dispute about the Court’s conclusion, I shall not 
pursue this matter further. Instead, I will investigate whether, 
regardless of the constitutionality of the legislation, its benefits 
outweigh the costs to religious liberty. 
 Religious vilification legislation has the obviously desirable 
aims of promoting religious tolerance and inclusion as well as 
protecting citizens from being perceived in hateful ways. Its critics, 
however, wonder whether legislation which opens the door to legal 
battles over the meaning of religious texts is likely to achieve the goal 
of promoting tolerance. Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh, in commenting 
on the Tribunal decision in Catch the Fire Ministries, say: 
 
 153. Id. ¶ [98] (Nettle, J.A.). For the sake of completeness, it should also be mentioned 
that in terms of a 2006 amendment to the Act, a “religious purpose” is now defined in section 
11(2) as including “conveying or teaching a religion or proselytizing.” Equal Opportunity and 
Tolerance Legislation (Amendment) Act 2006 (Vict.), § 9. 
 154. The constitutional right to free exercise has no bearing on the RRTA, however, 
because that is Victorian legislation and, as noted above, section 116 applies only to 
Commonwealth laws. 
 155. See supra Part II. 
 156. Catch the Fire Ministries Inc. 235 A.L.R. 750, ¶¶ [111]–[113] (Nettle J.A.); id. ¶¶ 
[203]–[210] (Neave J.A.). 
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protagonists in the courts and result in increased religious 
intolerance and disharmony.157
Another problem, raised by Patrick Parkinson, is the chilling 
effect of potential litigation on legitimate religious activity.
 
158 As he 
points out, the possibility of an expensive lawsuit “may intimidate 
religious leaders . . . from teaching and expressing what they believe 
their faith requires . . . .”159 The subjectivity of the tests the courts 
are required to apply under the RRTA obviously exacerbates the 
problem to which Parkinson refers. The exemptions provision is the 
most obvious vehicle for arbitrary judgments, but in Catch the Fire 
Ministries it even proved difficult for the judges to gauge the effect 
of the conduct on the audience to which it was directed. In 
particular, they could not agree on whether the application of the 
“audience” test would have been more or less favorable to the 
respondents than the test which the Tribunal applied.160
A further problematic feature of the Act to which Parkinson calls 
attention is the fact that it provides for civil remedies for vilification. 
The consequence is that anyone can commence proceedings and that 
there is no mechanism for filtering out unmeritorious cases.
 
161
Finally, Catch the Fire Ministries demonstrates the potential of 
religious vilification laws to entangle the government in religious 
matters in a troubling way. The Victorian legislation compels 
tribunals and courts to investigate matters of religious belief and to 
evaluate religious practices, such as determining whether a speaker’s 
religiously motivated speech is in “good faith,” “reasonable” and 
used for a “genuine” religious purpose.
 
162
 
 157. REX AHDAR & IAN LEIGH, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE LIBERAL STATE 386 
(2005). 
 158. Patrick Parkinson, Religious Vilification, Anti-Discrimination Laws and Religious 
Minorities in Australia: The Freedom to be Different, 81 AUSTL. L.J. 954, 959 (2007). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Catch the Fire Ministries Inc. 235 A.L.R. 750, ¶ [73] (Nettle J.A.); id. ¶ [132] 
(Ashley J.A.); id. ¶ [181] (Neave J.A.). 
 161. Parkinson, supra note 158, at 962. 
 162. See generally Catch the Fire Ministries Inc., 235 A.L.R. 750. 
 It may lead them to ask, 
as we have seen, whether the speaker’s views are balanced or 
theologically accurate. Even the need to gauge the effect of the 
speaker’s conduct on the audience is a source of potential 
entanglement in doctrinal issues since, as Lawrence McNamara 
observes: 
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[T]he court must necessarily make judgements about the audience 
that include judgements about the nature of their faith (for 
example, whether it is a forgiving one) and the extent to which the 
religious audience adheres to the tenets of its faith (for example, 
the faith may be forgiving, but the audience is not).163
Insofar as discrimination and vilification on religious grounds are 
concerned, first, there are no constitutional guarantees of equality in 
the Commonwealth or State Constitutions. Second, although 
HREOC can investigate complaints of discrimination in employment 
based on religion, the HREOC Act does not provide enforceable 
remedies. Third, the only federal legislation expressly prohibiting 
discrimination on the ground of religion is in the context of 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Although Australia is, by and large, a tolerant society, this Article 
has identified significant gaps in the de iure protection afforded 
religion. Legal protection for religious rights in Australia is not only 
limited but also affected by arbitrary factors such as where an 
individual lives and whether the religious group to which he/she 
belongs can be categorized as an “ethnic” group. I will summarize 
the legal position to conclude this study. 
Insofar as freedom of religion is concerned, first, although there 
is a constitutional guarantee of non-establishment and free exercise, 
the guarantee restricts the legislative power of the Commonwealth 
only and it is relatively toothless. Second, the only other 
constitutional guarantee for freedom of religion, contained in the 
Tasmanian Constitution, can be repealed by an ordinary Act of the 
Tasmanian Parliament. Third, while HREOC has the power to 
investigate violations of rights contained in the ICCPR and the 
Religion Declaration, the HREOC Act does not provide enforceable 
remedies for the violation of these rights. Fourth, bills of rights in 
the ACT and Victoria protect the right to religious freedom but do 
not permit invalidation of legislation which is incompatible with this 
right. Finally, there is no other State or Territory legislation 
protecting freedom of religion. In short, the formal protections 
afforded religious freedom under Australian law are relatively weak—
particularly when compared to many other liberal democracies. 
 
 163. Lawrence McNamara, Salvation and the State: Religious Vilification Laws and 
Religious Speech, in HATE SPEECH AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AUSTRALIA 145, 160 
(Katharine Gelber & Adrienne Stone eds., 2007). 
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termination of employment. And, although some religious groups 
will be indirectly protected against discrimination and vilification 
under federal racial discrimination law, this protection extends only 
to those individuals whose religious adherence is associated with 
ethnicity. Fourth, although discriminatory legislation can be 
challenged in the ACT and Victoria under their respective bills of 
rights, such legislation cannot be struck down. Finally, protection 
against discrimination and vilification on the ground of religion or 
ethno-religious origin is not available in all of the States. 
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